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Abstract
Using the universe of large Canadian manufacturing ﬁrms in 1988 and 1996, we investigate
to what extent ﬁrms’ outsourcing decision can be explained by a simple property rights model.
A novel aspect of the data is the availability of component level information on outputs as
well as inputs which permits the construction of a very detailed measure of vertical integration.
Moreover, we construct ﬁve diﬀerent measures of technological intensity to proxy for investments
that are likely to be speciﬁc to a buyer-seller relationship. Our main ﬁndings are that (i) greater
speciﬁcity makes outsourcing less likely; (ii) complementarities between the investments of the
buyer and the seller are also associated with less outsourcing; (iii) only when we focus on
the range of transactions with low complementarities do we ﬁnd support for several nuanced
predictions of the property rights model.
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The principal objective of this paper is to understand how producer and supplier investment in-
tensities inﬂuence the optimal ownership structure. In particular, we ask whether the observed
relationship between technological intensities and outsourcing patterns in Canadian manufacturing
is consistent with predictions of the property rights theory of the ﬁrm.
Technology is likely to be an important factor in ﬁrms’ outsourcing decisions. The spread of
information and communication technology has certainly contributed to the increased fragmenta-
tion of production across ﬁrms, potentially located in diﬀerent countries (Abramovsky and Griﬃth
2006). More generally, it is sometimes argued that technology enhances outsourcing beneﬁts, for
example allowing greater specialization, and ﬁrms would be expected to become smaller and/or
more decentralized (Brynjolfsson, et al. 1994; Quinn 2000). At the same time, new technologies
could raise the value of assets within an existing relationship more than outside it, for example
because of greater customization. Firms fearing expropriation of investments could be expected to
reduce outsourcing (Williamson 1985).
Little systematic evidence exists on how technological intensity inﬂuences outsourcing and un-
der what conditions. One example, Mol (2005) shows that in the Dutch manufacturing sector the
relationship between R&D intensity and outsourcing recently switched from negative to positive.1
While concerns over opportunism and expropriation still exist, he conjectures that a higher scale
of production, increased specialization between industries, and more sophisticated relational con-
tracting now make it more advantageous to outsource some R&D intensive activities. A second
example, discussed in greater detail in the next section, Acemoglu, Aghion, Griﬃth, and Zilibotti
(2005) (henceforth AAGZ) tests implicitly between the predictions of transaction cost economics
(TCE) and the property rights theory (PRT). TCE predicts that, all else equal, higher asset speci-
ﬁcity makes integration more likely, irrespective of which ﬁrm is making the speciﬁc investments. In
contrast, the PRT distinguishes theoretically between forward and backward integration, but this
distinction tends to be unobservable. Assuming only one type of integration is empirically relevant,
producer and supplier investments should have opposite eﬀects on the probability of outsourcing,
which is borne out in their sample.
Our empirical work is guided by an explicit theoretical model that features producer and
supplier investments which are both speciﬁc to the relationship and potentially exhibit complemen-
tarities. As discussed in Whinston (2003), there are many ways to operationalize the PRT, leading
to diﬀerent predictions. We restrict the eﬀects investments can have in the model in a number of
plausible ways to obtain testable predictions. One crucial aspect that all PRT approaches share
is that allocating control rights has beneﬁts and disadvantages. It will strengthen the investment
incentives of the controlling ﬁrm, at the expense of weaker incentives for the acquired ﬁrm. Our
model shares this feature with the existing empirical work, which is reviewed in the next section.
1Mol (2005) contains references to several other studies predicting the eﬀect of technology on outsourcing going
in either direction.
1A novel feature of our theoretical model is to incorporate complementarities between the
investments made by the two ﬁrms that are transacting—“cooperative” investments in Che and
Hausch (1999). These authors have shown that when committing not to renegotiate is impossible,
contracts are without value in this situation, making the PRT framework particularly appropriate.
Following the literature that studies externalities between diﬀerent actions, we call these “com-
plementary” investments — see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for a landmark application and Athey
and Stern (2003) for an overview of estimation methodologies. The concept is frequently relied
upon to explain why several activities in a ﬁrm’s internal organization tend to be adopted together,
but it has much wider applicability. In general, two activities are complementary if adoption of
one activity increases the marginal productivity of a second activity.2 A number of papers, re-
viewed in the next section, have studied how complementarities between diﬀerent actions of one
ﬁrm inﬂuences the optimal level of outsourcing. Roberts (2004) (p. 218) has suggested that com-
plementarities between investments of diﬀerent ﬁrms could serve as a theory of the ﬁrm, but we
have not seen previous work that models this explicitly.3
With complementarities, one ﬁrm’s investment raises the marginal eﬀect of the other ﬁrm’s
investment. Oﬀ the equilibrium path in a backward vertically integrated situation, a fraction of
the supplier’s investment is lost to the producer (owner) if investments are not fully appropriable.
Complementarities will increase the wedge between the marginal return of the owner’s own invest-
ment under joint production versus a break-up. In relative terms, it reduces the owner’s outside
option more, which increases the investment incentives for the subsidiary and ameliorates the prin-
cipal form of underinvestment under integration. We will show formally under what circumstances
complementarities raise the likelihood of vertical integration.
Note that our terminology is intended to capture something diﬀerent from “complementarities”
in Hart and Moore (1990), which refers to the extent an investment remains productive if it is
separated from the human capital of the investor. They use complementarity to describe a property
of a created asset and an asset that is intrinsically connected to the investing ﬁrm. In our model,
the only assets are those created by the investments—there is no human capital—and we use
complementarity to describe a property of the investments made by diﬀerent ﬁrms. What Hart
and Moore (1990) calls investments that are “perfectly complementary,” we will call investments
that are “impossible to appropriate.” In both cases, marginal investment returns on disagreement
payoﬀs under nonintegration are reduced to zero, leading to the prediction that such a feature will
increases the likelihood of investments being co-owned.
We investigate the make-or-buy decision of Canadian manufacturing ﬁrms and focus on tech-
nologies that are likely to be important in production. Many technologies come embodied in assets
which are to varying degrees speciﬁc to the trading relation they are employed in. Investments can
2If the activities are continuous variables, the cross-partial derivative of the objective function (proﬁt, productivity)
with respect to both activities is positive (negative if the objective is the cost function).
3Lindbeck and Snower (2003) contains some similar ideas, but they tend to focus on economies of scale and scope
within a single production factor.
2also be speciﬁc to a particular producer-supplier relationship if they serve to customize an input.
With imperfect contractibility, such asset speciﬁcity gives rise to a potential hold-up problem.
The empirical approach is related to the work of AAGZ on the U.K. manufacturing sector,
but our data has three notable beneﬁts. First, as we observe inputs and outputs at the plant level
at very disaggregate level (6-digit commodities), we do not need to rely on input-output tables to
construct our outsourcing measure. Rather, for each plant we can check directly whether any of
its inputs are produced by another plant owned by the same ﬁrm.4 The cost-share of an input is
also measured at the ﬁrm-commodity level.
Second, linking our sample to the national survey on technology adoption, we can construct
several measures of technological intensity at the industry level. In addition to R&D intensity
and the capital-labor ratio, similarly as AAGZ, we construct measures of advanced technology use,
frequency of innovative activities, and importance of human capital. These latter measures might
have a more direct link to investments in speciﬁc assets or to eﬀorts to customize inputs that feature
in the theory. In addition, we can use the product detail to classify each input as a homogenous
or diﬀerentiated good, following Rauch (1999). This provides an observable indicator of how likely
it is that the PRT framework—which has asset speciﬁcity and the existence of quasi-rents at its
core—is empirically relevant.
Third, we can construct proxies for several of the most important variables in the model.
This is an important aspect of our work as it links the diﬀerent theoretical concepts to observable
variables. The extent of production complementarities is measured by the overlap in inputs between
the producer’s core output and the input under study. We construct a number of proxies for
speciﬁcity and the outside options of the ﬁrms. The diﬀerent investment intensities have a natural
ranking in terms of appropriability.
In the PRT framework, various aspects of investments inﬂuence the theoretical predictions.5
Mapping the theoretical constructs into observable measures is a delicate undertaking. We beneﬁt
from unusually rich data that we can use to investigate whether the organization of transactions
and investments that are most likely to satisfy the PRT assumptions follows the PRT predictions.
One would not expect the PRT approach to be able to explain the outsourcing-integration trade-
oﬀ for all transactions in the economy. We will provide evidence that where we would expect the
theory to apply, observed patterns are in line with the predictions.
In particular, the results concord more with the theory if the inputs are diﬀerentiated products.
Integration becomes less attractive if the returns on investment outside the relationship improve,
as proxied by the number of alternative clients. AAGZ has shown theoretically and provided
evidence that the predictions are strengthened if an input makes up a larger share of the producer’s
cost, which also holds in our data. In addition, we ﬁnd that suﬃciently large complementarities
4Because most input-output tables are an aggregation of plant-commodity level information, our measures are
more detailed. If one plant does not use all of the inputs that the set of plants in its industry uses, we avoid
introducing spurious observations in our analysis.
5Diﬀerent parameters in the theoretical capture the extent of speciﬁcity, complementarities, appropriability.
3will trump PRT considerations and lead to integration even if both ﬁrms make important speciﬁc
investments. Finally, all predictions depend on the ease with which the owner of an integrated
ﬁrm can appropriate the subsidiary’s investment, which varies across the diﬀerent measures of
technology intensity. If appropriability increases, integration becomes less attractive.
Our results indicate, ﬁrst, that speciﬁcity is an important determinant of the vertical integra-
tion or outsourcing decision of manufacturing ﬁrms. Second, we ﬁnd that production complemen-
tarities increase the likelihood of integration, consistent with our theory. Third, turning to the
more nuanced predictions of the PRT, the eﬀects of producer and supplier technological intensity
on the outsourcing probability should depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of each ﬁrm’s
investment intensity. Greater asymmetry between these intensities, which could mean more invest-
ments by producers or suppliers, should lead to integration. We do ﬁnd strong empirical support
for the augmented PRT predictions, but only for the range of transactions where complementarities
between producer and supplier investments are low. Investment asymmetries lead to integration:
producer investments lead to integration if they dominate, but to outsourcing if supplier investments
are more important (and vice versa for supplier investments). These predictions are reinforced if
the cost share is large, and if investments are more speciﬁc or harder to appropriate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses empirical approaches
to test the PRT and the existing evidence. Section 3 introduces a bilateral trading model with
complementarities and derives a number of theoretical predictions. The empirical speciﬁcation is
provided in Section 4 and the data is described in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the results and
lessons from the analysis are summarized at the end.
2 Empirical tests of the property rights model
An important feature of both the PRT and TCE is the existence of speciﬁc investments which have
a greater value within the relationship than outside it. Researchers have tested the TCE model
by verifying whether observable measures of asset speciﬁcity—plausibly related to appropriable
quasi-rents—are associated with an increased probability of vertical integration.6 By and large this
has proven to be the case, see surveys by Joskow (1988) and Shelanski and Klein (1995). However,
as Whinston (2003) illustrates clearly for a number of prominent studies, such evidence in support
of TCE does not automatically carry over to the PRT.
One of the unique features of the PRT is the indivisibility of control.7 In contrast with the
TCE approach, each division of an integrated ﬁrm is explicitly assumed to maximize its own proﬁt,
choosing investments noncooperatively, just like two independent ﬁrms that are transacting in the
6The TCE approach, see for example Williamson (1979), posits that when quasi-rents are present, production will
be ineﬃcient as parties engage in costly activities to appropriate them. Without formally modeling the resolution of
the hold-up problem, TCE predicts that we are more likely to observe outsourcing when the risk of hold-up is small.
7The PRT’s focus on ex ante investment versus TCE’s focus on ex post adaptation seems mostly a matter of
modeling convenience, as noted by Whinston (2003) (footnote 6). Klein et al. (1978) (p. 301) acknowledges explicitly
that distortions of ex ante investments, which give rise to the quasi-rents in the ﬁrst place, are likely.
4market. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) note explicitly that the deﬁning diﬀerence between
a long-term contract and vertical integration is in the possibility of (greater) postcontractual op-
portunistic reneging in the former organizational form. While conceding that “vertical integration
does not completely avoid contracting problems (footnote 4),” they maintain that “the crucial as-
sumption underlying the analysis of this paper is that, as assets become more speciﬁc and more
appropriable quasi rents are created (...), the costs of contracting will generally increase more than
the costs of vertical integration. Hence, ceteris paribus, we are more likely to observe vertical
integration.” (Klein et al. (1978) p. 298).
In contrast, the optimal organizational form in the PRT depends crucially on the relative
marginal eﬀect of each ﬁrm’s investment rather than on the absolute size of the appropriable quasi-
rent. In an integrated ﬁrm, investment incentives of the owner are enhanced but those of the
subsidiary are weakened. While a literal interpretation of the PRT model leads to implausible
predictions, as illustrated by Holmstrom (1999), the model is extremely useful to highlight the
importance of exit rights as an incentive mechanism. The marketability of a ﬁrm’s investments is
an important disciplining device for its contracting party.
A few empirical studies have found support for the PRT by looking in detail at one speciﬁc
industry. Woodruﬀ (2002) studies the ownership structure between retailers and producers in the
made-to-order Mexican footwear industry. He ﬁnds opposing eﬀects of speciﬁcity on integration,
depending on which party is making the speciﬁc investments. Greater product variety or higher
quality materials, two attributes that arguably increase the hold-up risk mostly for the producer,
are positively associated with integration. However, increased fashion turnover, which puts the onus
on the retailer to learn consumers’ taste, is associated with less integration. Under the maintained
assumption that the (much smaller) retailers will never want to integrate backward into production,
all three patterns are consistent with the PRT, while the TCE would predict more integration also
in the latter case.
Baker and Hubbard (2003) studies the diﬀusion of on-board computers in the U.S. trucking
industry and ﬁnds that it lead to a greater use of internal divisions, as opposed to for-hire car-
riers. Their interpretation is that the ability to monitor the agent (driver) more eﬀectively lead
to diminished scope for underinvestment (in driving eﬀort) and reduced the beneﬁt of relying on
owner-operators.
A number of papers in international trade have also adopted the PRT framework. Work in this
ﬁeld is facilitated by the fact that oﬃcial statistics distinguish between transactions occurring within
and between ﬁrms. Antr` as (2003) compares across industries the share of U.S. exports that consists
of intraﬁrm trade and ﬁnds that this fraction is increasing in the capital-labor ratio. Assuming
that capital is relationship-speciﬁc, he justiﬁes this pattern as the optimal outsourcing decision in
a PRT model. Another application in international trade is Feenstra and Hanson (2005) which
reconciles the observed allocation of ownership and control in China’s export processing sector
with the predictions of an augmented PRT model. They ﬁnd that in most cases foreign ﬁrms retain
5ownership and control of the plant, while the local partner controls input-purchasing.8
AAGZ (Acemoglu et al. 2005) employs a novel approach to overcome data limitations on
the ownership structure in the economy at large. For the universe of manufacturing ﬁrms in the
U.K., they verify whether a producer (ﬁrm) owns a plant in any of the industries that the national
input-output table indicates to be supplier-industries. Their main ﬁnding is that increased R&D
intensity in the producer or supplier industry has opposite eﬀects on the likelihood that a ﬁrm owns
plants in both industries. The signs on the eﬀects are consistent with the relevant trade-oﬀ in the
data being between backward vertical integration (producer owns supplier) and outsourcing. In this
case, integration strengthens producer incentives, while outsourcing encourages supplier investment.
They note that the asymmetric eﬀects are consistent with the PRT, while TCE considerations would
suggest that any increase in the importance of speciﬁc investments (R&D) would make integration
more likely.
The discussion in Whinston (2003) indicates that a rich speciﬁcation of (cross-) investment
eﬀects—allowing for both ﬁrms’ investments to aﬀect both ﬁrms’ outside options in the integrated
and outsourced organizational form—mostly leads to ambiguous eﬀects. In order to obtain un-
ambiguous predictions, AAGZ restrict the impact of investments on the outside options in several
respects.9 Given that we also attempt to investigate the predictive power of the PRT exploit-
ing variation across industries, we will employ many of the same restrictions to get unambiguous
predictions.
As mentioned earlier, one important addition we introduce in the PRT model is to allow for
complementarities. The marginal contribution of one ﬁrm’s investment can be increasing in the
investment level of the second ﬁrm. Papers in the complementarity literature model this with
interactions of investments in the objective function, and we will follow that modeling strategy.10
A number of papers with complementarities have discussed the impact on the theory of the ﬁrm.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) argues that technology will make equipment more ﬂexible and less
speciﬁc, reducing the incentive for vertical integration. It is also mentioned that the theory could
predict less outsourcing if demand was more uncertain, requiring increased coordination between
tasks, but only if coordination could be provided more cheaply within the ﬁrm. They discard this
possibility as inconsistent with anecdotal evidence in the press. Novak and Stern (2003) develops a
model where outsourcing of one automotive component can create externalities for other sourcing
decisions. The source of the externality in their model is the interdependency in coordination eﬀorts
or the need for disclosure of proprietary trade secrets. Outsourcing of one component is predicted
to increase the likelihood that other components will be outsourced as well. They ﬁnd support for
this in a conﬁdential data set for the automotive industry.
8More empirical work on this subject is ongoing in the trade literature, see for example Nunn and Treﬂer (2007).
9Under the following restrictions on marginal investment returns, the model in Whinston (2003) is exactly equal
to the model in Acemoglu et al. (2005): σB1 = σS1 = σB0 = βS0 = 0, σS0 < αS, βS1 < αS, βB0 < αB, βB1 = αB.
10Important papers in this literature are Milgrom and Roberts (1990) (theory), Athey and Stern (2003) (empir-
ical methodology), and Arora and Gambardella (1990) and Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) are important
applications.
6Only Roberts (2004) considers complementarities between investments of diﬀerent ﬁrms. He
suggests that it makes coordination more important and that it could be a motivation for integra-
tion. This prediction is in line with our ﬁndings, at least for some parameter values. Before turning
to the evidence, we ﬁrst illustrate how the existence of complementarities modiﬁes the standard
PRT model.
3 Model
Consider a bilateral trade setting between a producer (P) that purchases an input from a supplier
(S). Both ﬁrms can make unobservable, noncontractible, investments that raise the value produced
within the relationship, for example by investing in relationship-speciﬁc assets or customizing an
input. The joint surplus created in the relationship takes the following form:
F(xP,xS) = αPxP + αSxS + αPSxPxS. (1)
The x variables denote the investments of the two ﬁrms. Each has a direct eﬀect on the surplus,
αP and αS, and an additional indirect eﬀect, αPS. The interaction term is what distinguishes our
approach from earlier models. It represents complementarities: the marginal value of each ﬁrm’s
investment is increased if the other ﬁrm invests more (∂2F/∂xP∂xS > 0). Complementarities are
independent of the organizational form. However, they are only realized if both investments are
combined in production, i.e. under joint production or when one ﬁrm controls the outcomes of both
investments (integration).
We assume that a generic input can be produced at zero cost or without any relationship-










The timeline of decisions is as follows. First, the parties decide on an organizational form: the
producer buys the supplier, i.e. backward vertical integration (VIB); unintegrated production or
outsourcing (O); or the supplier controls the ﬁrm, i.e. forward vertical integration (VIF). Transfers
between the ﬁrms before any investments are made will guarantee that each ﬁrm receives at least its
reservation payoﬀ and that the adopted organizational form maximizes joint proﬁts. Second, under
each of the three organizational forms, investments are made noncooperatively by both parties.
Third, the surplus is divided between the two ﬁrms using Nash bargaining, with each ﬁrm receiving
equal weight.
If ex post the relationship breaks down and no joint production takes place (which does not
happen on the equilibrium path), each party receives its outside option. This depends on the
ownership form that has been put in place before investments are made. If the producer owns the
7supplier, the outside options are as follows:
πV IB
P (xP,xS) = F(xP,λxS), (3)
πV IB
S (xP,xS) = 0.
The supplier loses the customized input or its asset, as it is owned and controlled by the producer,
and receives nothing. It could make generic inputs for another ﬁrm and sell them at cost, but no
proﬁt will be made. Ownership gives the producer the beneﬁt of the customized input, but we
assume it does not yield the same value as in harmonious joint production. For example, some
tacit knowledge of how to use the input is not passed on or some ﬁnal customization touches would
only be put in place by the supplier at the last minute. As a result, only a fraction λ ∈ [0,1] of the
supplier’s investment will be productive. An important departure from the models in Whinston
(2003) or AAGZ is that with complementarities the loss of a fraction of the supplier investment also
reduces the marginal return of the producer’s own investment. The outside options in the forward
vertical integration relation are symmetric.11
If the parties had formed an outsourcing arrangement, giving each control over its own invest-
ment in the case of a break-up, the outside options would be
πO
P(xP,xS) = F(θxP,0), (4)
πO
S (xP,xS) = F(0,θxS).
As each ﬁrm retains control over its own investment, the complementarities in equation (1) will not
be realized if the relationship breaks up. Moreover, given that the producer has to ﬁnd another
partner to supply it with generic inputs that do not match as well with its own investments and the
supplier has to ﬁnd another producer that requires somewhat diﬀerent customization, we assume
that the value of their investments will be reduced to a fraction θ ∈ [0,1] of their value within the
original relationship, again modeled symmetrically for the two ﬁrms. It is likely that the loss when
the speciﬁc investments are not combined in production will be larger than the loss when at least
one party controls both investments, i.e. θ ≤ λ, but we do not impose it.12
11As we have no reason to assume otherwise, we model the same fractional loss in producer investments (λ) to the
supplier.
12Our model imposes a number of restrictions on the model of Whinston (2003), which we share with AAGZ, to
obtain unambiguous predictions on the eﬀect of technology intensities on organizational form. If we limit attention to
situations where the supplier-producer link is very strong (φ = 1 in AAGZ), the following restrictions are important:
1. Under integration, the return on investment in the outside option of acquired ﬁrm is low. We followed AAGZ
in specifying that σP1 = σS1 = 0, but weaker assumptions are certainly possible. For example, Hart (1995)
(chapter 2) only speciﬁes that σS1 < σS0 < αS and obtains similar predictions.
2. Still under integration, the return on self-investment in the outside option of the acquiring ﬁrm is high, but
that on cross-investments by the acquired ﬁrm is low. We assumed that βP1 = αP and βS1 < αS, but weaker
assumptions, for example αS > βP1 > βP0 as in Hart (1995), would not change the predictions. (Note that
Hart (1995) uses a stronger restriction on cross-investments: βS1 = 0.)
3. In an outsourcing relationship, cross-investments are of no value (βS0 = σP0 = 0) if production is not joint
and the return on self-investments is lower outside the relationship than inside (βP0 < αP and σS0 < αS).
8As a benchmark, the ﬁrst best investments in the presence of complementarities maximize the
aggregate welfare function:



















Both investments are increasing in each of the three parameters in the joint surplus production
function. For αPS = 0 this boils down to the model in AAGZ. Given that the marginal investment
costs are normalized to xP and xS, the model is only well-deﬁned if αPS < 1. Even if one investment
has no direct eﬀect on the surplus production, say αS = 0, it will still not be set at zero as it has
an indirect eﬀect by raising the productivity of xP if αPS > 0. It will be the case, though, that
xP > xS.
Optimal investments under the diﬀerent organizational forms will be decided by each party
noncooperatively. Anticipating Nash bargaining (with equal weight for both parties) to split the









S(xP,xS)] − Ck(xk), (7)
where the appropriate outside options for each organizational form z ∈ {V IB,O,V IF} have to be
substituted. As both ﬁrms take their decisions simultaneously, a Nash equilibrium of the noncoop-
erative investment-game is obtained by the intersection of the two ﬁrms’ best response functions.
Because the entire problem is set up symmetrically for the producer and supplier, we only
have to solve for the determinants of the trade-oﬀ between backward vertical integration and
outsourcing. The trade-oﬀ between forward vertical integration and outsourcing will be symmetric.


































Without complementarities, these results are consistent with those in AAGZ, and we can unambigu-
ously say that comparing V IB to O, underinvestment is reduced for the producer, but exacerbated
for the supplier.
With complementarities, this pattern will not necessarily hold anymore. A ﬁrst thing to note
9is that the optimal investments under V IB are decreasing in λ, the fraction of the supplier’s
investment that can be appropriated by the producer in the case of a break-up. At the extreme, if
λ = 1, the supplier will not invest anything, because the outside option of the producer equals the
entire joint surplus. As a result, even though the producer has all the power in the relationship,
only the direct eﬀect of his investment will be realized and he will only invest αP, which potentially
falls far short of x∗
P. Even in the best situation for V IB, if λ = 0, both ﬁrms invest less than
the ﬁrst best. Because of the complementarities, the underinvestment of the supplier spills over
to the producer, which sees his marginal return on investment falls. It does remain true that
underinvestment will be more pronounced for the supplier than for the producer.
In the outsourcing arrangement, both ﬁrms’ investments are increasing in θ. Even in the most
advantageous situation, where investments are equally valuable outside the relationship (θ = 1),
ﬁrms will again invest less than in the ﬁrst best situation. The appropriable quasi-rent is now the
value of complementarities and noncooperative decision-making leads each party to only consider
half of this value when deciding on its own investment. This lowers the denominator in (9) and
results in a lower multiplier eﬀect of the complementarities. If investments are entirely speciﬁc
(θ = 0), investments are only half as large as the ﬁrms now discount both the direct and indirect
eﬀects of their investments.
Comparing the two organizational forms, we ﬁnd that with complementarities it becomes
possible that the supplier’s investment is larger under V IB than under O. This will be the case in
the situation that is most favorable to integration, λ = θ = 0, but ceases to hold if either λ or θ grows
too large. Under the same assumptions, the producer’s investment will be larger under integration
than under outsourcing,13 but this does not hold generally anymore with complementarities. If it is
too easy for the producer to take control over the supplier’s assets (λ is high), reduced investment by
the supplier will lower the marginal return to the owner’s investment through the complementarities.
As a result, it is possible that the producer invests more under outsourcing. This is more likely to
happen if investments are less speciﬁc (θ is high). At the extreme, if λ = θ = 1, investments of both
parties will be larger under outsourcing than integration and integration will never be desirable. In
general, there exists a lower threshold λ for λ below which xV IB
P > xO
P and an even more stringent
lower threshold such that xV IB
S > xO
S. Both thresholds are declining in θ.
Proposition 1 There exist r, r, and αPS such that if αPS < αPS the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium ownership structure, z∗, is given as follows:
z∗ = V IB for αP/αS > r,
z∗ = O for αP/αS ∈ (r,r), and
z∗ = V IF for αP/αS < r.
Moreover, ∂r/∂θ > 0 and ∂r/∂θ < 0; and ∂r/∂λ > 0 and ∂r/∂λ < 0.




P if αP/αS < αPS/2, but in such a situation V IF will be
preferred over V IB, and the adjustment margin between V IB and O is irrelevant.
10Taking the limit for αPS going to zero, the proof boils down to the proof of Proposition 1 in
Acemoglu et al. (2005).14 Diﬀerentiating r and r establishes the comparative static results.15
The prediction from Proposition 1 is intuitive. When the direct marginal eﬀect of investment
by the supplier (αS) is zero, the optimal ownership structure will be integration with the producer in
control. If only investment by the producer matters, we want to give him optimal incentives. When
αS rises relative to αP, the optimal ownership structure shifts at some point to outsourcing as the
rising importance of the supplier’s investment makes her underinvestment under V IB increasingly
costly for the joint surplus production. Eventually, if αS becomes suﬃciently large it will even
be optimal to put the supplier in control of the integrated ﬁrm. If investments are less speciﬁc
and remain somewhat productive when used in isolation (high θ), the range for αP/αS where
outsourcing is ideal expands. If it is easier for the owner of the integrated ﬁrm to appropriate the
subsidiary’s investments (high λ), outsourcing becomes more attractive because investment by the
acquired ﬁrm declines further (the underinvestment problem under integration becomes worse).
Introducing complementarities (αPS) complicates the analysis substantially because now each
ﬁrm’s marginal return on investment depends on the other ﬁrm’s decision. While we cannot estab-
lish the impact on the likelihood of vertical integration in general, we can sign the eﬀect in come
cases. We discuss two predictions. First, Proposition 2 establishes that the equilibrium ownership
structure from Proposition 1 does not hold anymore for suﬃciently large complementarities. In
such a case there exists a range of parameter values for λ and θ where outsourcing dominates
integration even if one of the ﬁrm’s investment has no direct impact on the joint surplus.
Proposition 2 There exists αPS,λ(θ) such that if αPS > αPS and λ > λ the optimal ownership
structure will be outsourcing even if αS = 0. Moreover, ∂λ/∂θ < 0.
Proof in Appendix.
Second, we show how the equilibrium ownership structure (as deﬁned in Proposition 1) is
changed at the margin when small complementarities are introduced. Given that the optimal
investments under V IB are a decreased function of λ when complementarities are present, the
eﬀects again depend crucially on the level of λ. A lower λ worsens the outside option of the
producer and raises supplier investment. In turn, this raises the marginal beneﬁt of producer
investment through complementarities, increasing the optimal xP. Only if the θ and λ parameters
are suﬃciently low are we certain that the producer invests more under (backward) integration than
under outsourcing. In other words, only if investments are suﬃciently speciﬁc and suﬃciently hard
to appropriate can we unambiguously determine the eﬀect on the optimal organizational structure.
Proposition 3 There exist a λ and αPS, such that if λ < λ and αPS < αPS the probability of
outsourcing is negatively related to the size of complementarities. λ has the following properties:
14For some parameter values r > r and outsourcing will never be optimal. Given that we do observe a lot of
outsourcing in the data, we follow AAGZ by limiting attention to the parameter space where this situation does not
occur.
15Note that we have deﬁned λ as one minus the same parameter in AAGZ.
11• ∂λ/∂θ ≤ 0
• ∂λ/∂αPS > 0
The proof is in the Appendix, but the intuition is straightforward. If the loss that that the owner
(under integration) incurs in the outside option relative to joint production is suﬃciently large (λ
suﬃciently low), the existence of complementarities will make vertical integration more desirable.
Complementarities increase the diﬀerence between the producer’s payoﬀ inside and outside the
relationship, while they do not aﬀect the outside option of the subsidiary (the supplier). In relative
terms, complementarities worsen the outside option, hence the bargaining position, of the owner
and they lessen the underinvestment problem of the subsidiary.
Consider the optimal investments when they are highly speciﬁc and impossible to conﬁscate
(λ = θ = 0) and complementarities are extremely low. Equations (8) and (9) predict that both
xV IB
P > xO
P and xV IB
S > xO
S. Introducing a small amount of complementarities will raise the joint
production in proportion to xPxS, which will be larger under V IB than O. Complementarities raise
the marginal product of both parties’ investments more under V IB, because of higher counterpart
investment, making V IB more advantageous. At the same time, diﬀerentiating the investments in
(8) and (9) by αPS reveals that the supplier investments under V IB are the most responsive of
the four to complementarities. Hence, when αPS grows larger, V IB becomes even more preferable,
indicated in Proposition 3 by ∂λ/∂αPS > 0.
However, this mechanism only works if λ is suﬃciently low. For higher λ’s, the investments
under V IB decline relative to O. In particular, if λ > 0 and/or θ > 0, the producer investments
immediately become less responsive to complementarities under V IB than under O. Eventually,
for suﬃciently large complementarities, even supplier investments become less responsive to com-
plementarities under V IB than under O, making outsourcing more attractive, with the limit result
illustrated in Proposition 2.
Finally, if the value of the investments outside the relationship is increased (higher θ), the
threshold for λ below which complementarities favor integration declines, i.e. becomes more strin-
gent. In this case, underinvestment is less of a problem under outsourcing and investments become
more responsive to complementarities.
4 Empirical Model
The model yields a number of testable predictions on the relationship between outsourcing and
investment intensities (αP and αS), complementarities (αPS), and the speciﬁcity (θ) or appropri-
ability (λ) of investments. In this section we describe how we map the theoretical concepts into
observable variables and we describe the estimating equations.
The most important predictions relate investment intensities to outsourcing and several invest-
ment characteristics modify this relationship. In order to gauge the direct eﬀects of our empirical
measures of speciﬁcity, complementarities, and the cost-share on outsourcing, we ﬁrst estimate the
12following equation without technological intensities:
OUTSfj = α1Specificityfj + α2Complementij + α3Cost-sharefj + Controlsfj + fj. (10)
The dependent variable is an indicator that takes on the value of one if input j, which is used as
an input in any of the plants of ﬁrm f that produces output i, is not produced as an output by
any of ﬁrm f’s plants and zero otherwise.
The three variables of interest have straightforward predictions on the likelihood a ﬁrm out-
sources input j. If speciﬁcity is high, it will be harder or even impossible to purchase inputs on
the spot market. If complementarities are positive, integration becomes more attractive, at least
locally, as demonstrated in Proposition 3. If the cost-share is high, transaction cost considerations
would suggest that it becomes more eﬃcient to set up a customized governance system for input j,
such as internalizing production. Property rights considerations predict integration if the marginal
eﬀects of the two ﬁrms’ investments are suﬃciently unbalanced. If the cost-share is high, imbal-
ances will more quickly lead to integration and outsourcing becomes less likely. The data section
introduces several proxies for speciﬁcity and discusses how the other variables are constructed.
The controls included in this and all following equations include the size and age of ﬁrm f, as
well as industry averages for output i and input j. Every ﬁrm is associated with the industry of its
core output i.16 These variables control for the predictions in Stigler (1951) that outsourcing will
increase as industries mature and grow in size.
Additional variables are included to control for technological explanations for a ﬁrm’s out-
sourcing decision: productivity, composition of the workforce, and complexity of the product. More
eﬃcient ﬁrms are likely to have less of an incentive to outsource. A high share of non-production
workers could indicate a reduced focus on production activities or more advanced production and
lead to greater incentives to outsource non-core activities. Firms might be more reluctant or less
able to outsource parts of a complex production process, which we proxy with the number of inputs
required to produce the core output i.
A positive estimate on the α1 coeﬃcient in equation (10) would indicate that transactions
that involve speciﬁc assets, for example due to customization, have ceteris paribus a greater chance
of being vertically integrated. Next, we investigate whether the more nuanced predictions related
to marginal investment incentives, which are unique to the property rights view of the ﬁrm, are
supported.
In order to apply the model to the data, we add a random error z to aggregate welfare.
Backward vertical integration will be preferred over outsourcing if ∆W(α,λ,θ) ≡ WV IB(α,λ,θ)−
WO(α,λ,θ) ≥ V IB − O. Assuming the errors are normally distributed, comparative statics for
the ∆W entity can be investigated using a Probit model for the outsourcing indicator. The theory
suggests that the eﬀects are complicated and not monotone in most variables. The exercise is further
16Some of the speciﬁcity measures and controls vary only at the industry level, in which case the subscripts should
be ij instead of fj.
13complicated because integration can also be forward, i.e. if WV IF(α,λ,θ)−WO(α,λ,θ) ≥ V IF−O,
and there is no way to tell both forms of integration apart in the data.
At the very least, the impact of producer investments depends on the level of supplier invest-
ment. For example, limiting attention to the trade-oﬀ between backward vertical integration by
the producer and outsourcing in the absence of complementarities, Proposition 1 predicts that the
likelihood of integration is increasing in the ratio of the two ﬁrm’s marginal investment impact on
the joint surplus (αP/αS). This incorporates a crucial aspect of the property rights theory, that
control is intrinsically indivisible: it strengthens incentives for the party that receives control, but
weakens incentives for the party that loses it. The relative importance of both parties’ investments
will determine the optimal ownership structure.
Moreover, for an integrated ﬁrm it is impossible to know whether the producer owns the
supplier or vice versa. All we observe is whether an input is produced internally or outsourced. At
the margin, increases in technological intensity of suppliers and buyers still have opposite eﬀects
on the outsourcing decision, but this might not be apparent in a data set that combines a range
of industries. An increase in (relative) technological intensity of a producer (αP) will make it
optimal to choose a governance structure that provides better incentives to the producer to reduce
his underinvestment. It makes backward vertical integration more attractive than outsourcing,
consistent with the evidence in AAGZ, but it also makes outsourcing more attractive than forward
integration. The overall eﬀect on the vertical integration-outsourcing trade-oﬀ is ambiguous. AAGZ
cite previous studies to argue that only the former margin is relevant in manufacturing, but it seems
unnecessarily restrictive to limit attention to this case.
To incorporate the possibility of both forms of integration, one has to allow for the impact of










+ Controlsfj + εfj. (11)
Restricting βPS = 0 in equation (11), reduces it to the estimating equation in AAGZ. We predict
that βPS < 0, i.e. outsourcing is less likely if the two industries diﬀer a lot in investment intensity.
According to this speciﬁcation, the marginal impact of producer investment on outsourcing
will be proportional to βP + 2βPS(IIP
i − IIS
j ). If both industries are equally technology intensive,
the PRT predicts that an outsourcing arrangement is likely. Starting from such a situation, raising
the technological intensity of the producer should make (backward) vertical integration somewhat
more likely. Hence we expect βP < 0, as in AAGZ.17 If the relevant trade-oﬀ is between V IF and
O, a similar increase in producer investment should make outsourcing more likely. This situation
applies if IIS
j is much larger than IIP
i and the second term dominates the marginal eﬀect of producer
investment on outsourcing. It will be positive if βPS < 0. Similar reasoning for the supplier leads
to the prediction that βS < 0, which diﬀers from AAGZ as they assume that the only relevant
17Note that AAGZ use 1 − OUTSfj as dependent variable, inverting all signs compared to our speciﬁcation.
14margin in the data is between V IB and O.
A similar modeling approach would be to include the interaction of the two technological
intensities, γPS(IIP
i × IIS
j ), in equation (11) instead of the squared term.18 In this speciﬁcation,
the marginal impact of producer investment on outsourcing will be proportional to βP + γPSIIS
j .
At low levels of technological intensity of the supplier—αS close to zero in the theory and IIS
j
close to zero in the data—the relevant margin will be between O and V IB. As before, theory
predicts that producer investments will lead to integration and the eﬀect of IIP
i on outsourcing is
dominated by βP, which is expected to be negative. On the other hand, at very high levels of IIS
j ,
the other margin (between O and V IF) will be the relevant one and the eﬀect should be reversed.
Raising IIP
i now makes outsourcing more likely, which will be reﬂected in a positive coeﬃcient on
the interaction term (γPS > 0), which now dominates the marginal eﬀect.
The theoretical predictions are less clearcut if investments of producers and suppliers are
complementary, i.e. if the joint surplus is increased when both investments are raised together.
Proposition 3 indicates that the probability of outsourcing would be reduced, at least for moderate
complementarities and for suﬃciently low appropriability of investments. With complementarities,
one would expect high levels of investments by both ﬁrms, as can be seen directly from equations
(6). As a result, the presence of complementarities has the opposite eﬀect on the coeﬃcient of the
interaction term (or the square term) than the standard PRT eﬀect discussed above, making its
sign ambiguous. The mechanism is that complementarities lower the outside option and hence the
bargaining position of the controlling ﬁrm. Underinvestment of the subsidiary is diminished, which
is extremely costly in the case of complementarities. As a result, investments by the two ﬁrms will
be more similar than in the absence of complementarities, while at the same time the probability
of outsourcing is reduced.
Given that we observe a variable that captures (technological) complementarities directly, we

















+ Controlsfj + εfj. (12)
If complementarities are entirely absent, the predictions of Proposition 1 apply and we expect β0
PS <
0. Complementarities introduce an opposing eﬀect, according to the predictions of Proposition 3,
and we expect β1
PS > 0.
We estimate the three equations (10), (11), and (12) using ﬁve alternative measures of techno-
logical intensity which are introduced in the next section: skill, innovation, R&D, technology use,
and capital. These measures are likely to diﬀer in appropriability, corresponding to the λ parameter
in the theory. We have ordered them by increasing ease of appropriation, which should correspond
18The only diﬀerence would be that it omits the quadratic intensities, while their coeﬃcients in equation (11) are
restricted to be the negative of the interaction term coeﬃcient. The ﬂexible speciﬁcation we introduce below nests
both approaches.
15to increasing attractiveness of outsourcing.
At the same time, other observable variables will inﬂuence the expected eﬀects. Most notable
is the degree of speciﬁcity and theoretical results in AAGZ demonstrate that the PRT predictions
should be enhanced if the input makes up a larger share of the producer’s costs. Moreover, results
might be diﬀerent for multi-plant and single-plant ﬁrms. In order to allow ﬂexibly for all these




















This equation contains ﬁve technology intensity terms—two linear, two quadratic, and one inter-
action term—with a further 25 terms interacting the ﬁve technology terms with ﬁve variables (the
last two capture speciﬁcity and will be discussed in the next section). Using the estimates of equa-
tion (13), we can evaluate the marginal eﬀects of producer and supplier investments at various
points—high or low complementarity, high or low speciﬁcity, etc.—to verify to what extent the
results accord with the PRT predictions.
5 Data and Measurements
Outsourcing
The dependent variable in our analysis, the outsourcing dummy, is constructed using ﬁrm level data
on commodity inputs and outputs. The Canadian Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) collects
detailed commodity information on input use and outputs using the six-digit level of Standard
Classiﬁcations of Goods (SCG).19 It is a plant level data set, but contains ﬁrm identiﬁers to link
plants under common ownership. The commodity level input and output information is only
collected for larger plants, which receive an extended survey questionnaire.20 We use the 1988 and
1996 data.
The recorded input purchases include both within-ﬁrm transactions and transactions with
independent suppliers. Because we cannot distinguish the two types of transactions, we capture
outsourcing as a binary variable. If input j is purchased by any plant of ﬁrm f and none of its
Canadian plants list it as an output, we consider this input outsourced. If we observe positive
output of commodity j at any of the ﬁrm’s plants, we assume that the ﬁrm satisﬁes its entire input
19The ASM is the Canadian equivalent of the Longitudinal Research Database maintained by the U.S. Census.
It is a ﬁve-yearly census of all manufacturing establishments, with all large plants and a sample of smaller plants
interviewed annually.
20Approximately half of all plants, accounting for 85% of shipments, receive the long-form questionnaire.
16demand for j internally and we set the outsourcing dummy equal to zero.21
OUTSfj =
(
0 if input j is produced by at least one of the plants owned by ﬁrm f
1 if input j is not produced by any of the plants owned by ﬁrm f
Each ‘ﬁrm-input commodity’ combination fj (producer-supplier) constitutes a separate ob-
servation in our analysis.22,23 The total number of observations is the product of the the average
number of inputs and the total number of ﬁrms. The cost-share for this observation is calculated
as a the share of input j in total commodity inputs purchased by ﬁrm f (across all its Canadian
plants).
Technological intensity
The model relates the probability of outsourcing to (a) the relative importance of producer and
supplier investments, and (b) characteristics of these investments, such as their speciﬁcity, comple-
mentarity, and ease of appropriation. The theory provides predictions how outsourcing is expected
to vary with investment intensity, but does not specify the nature of the investments. For example,
AAGZ note that the investment must “require tacit knowledge or human capital”, so that “deci-
sion rights over these investments cannot be transferred between the two parties”. Their preferred
measure is R&D intensity, expenditures divided by value added, constructed at the industry level.
Physical capital intensity (again divided by value added and at the industry level), which is less
skewed both within and between industries, is used as a robustness check.
We use two comparable measures, R&D and capital intensity, and create three additional
measures of technological intensity: skill intensity, innovativeness, and technology use. The diﬀerent
investment intensities will be denoted by IIR&D, IIK/L, IIskill, IIinnov, and IItech. While these
measures do not necessarily represent speciﬁc investments in their own right, they are likely to be
associated with and accompanied by other (unobservable) investments which are speciﬁc.
Skill intensity is constructed as the fraction of employees in an industry, weighted by hours
worked, that attained some post-secondary education, including university degrees. Capital inten-
sity is deﬁned as the logarithm of the capital stock per hour worked.24
21An alternative assumption would be to consider input j as outsourced if the ﬁrm’s input requirements of j exceeds
its recorded output (across all its plants). In the vast majority of cases, both approaches give the same result.
22The deﬁnition of our dependent variable is similar to the one used by AAGZ, except that they construct a vertical
integration measure—the inverse of our outsourcing measure—using the U.K. input-output table at the industry level.
For each industry in which a ﬁrm has an active plant, the input-output table lists the set of input industries where
the ﬁrm might consider vertically integrating. If the ﬁrm owns a plant in one of these input industries, the integration
dummy is coded as one. Otherwise, the input is considered outsourced. Because the set of potential input industries
is large (all industries with positive values in the input-output table), outsourcing is extremely common in AAGZ:
the average of OUTSjf is 0.99 against 0.92 for us.
23Horta¸ csu and Syverson (2006) construct an integration dummy using the U.S. input-output table. This table is
more detailed than that of the U.K. and they only consider ownership in industries that provide at least 5% of the
inputs (backward) or purchase at least 5% of the output (forward).
24The education and hours worked information is available at the L-level of Input-Output industries (167 industries).
Capital stock data are only available at a slightly less disaggregate level (R-level or 123 industries), requiring some
17The measures of industry R&D, innovativeness, and technology adoption are constructed from
information collected through the 1993 Survey of the Innovation and Advanced Technology Sur-
vey, conducted by Statistics Canada for a representative sample of larger plants. No quantitative
information on investments is available, but it contains rich information on the frequency that man-
ufacturing plants engage in a variety of innovative activities. Detailed information on the survey is
in Baldwin and Hanel (2003).
Our measure for R&D intensity is the average frequency that plants report to engage in R&D
on an ongoing basis. The innovation intensity measures the frequency that product or process
innovations are introduced during the survey period. Technology use is measured as the average
number of advanced technologies (from a list of 26) in use by manufacturing plants in an industry.
All ﬁve technology variables are constructed at the industry level. One advantage over ﬁrm
level measures is that they average over ﬁrms with diﬀerent integration strategies, providing an
average characterization of the technological intensity of each industry (as pointed out by AAGZ).
As a robustness check, we can limit the analysis to outsourcing information in 1996, while the
technological intensities are constructed in 1993, further reducing the inﬂuence of the vertical
organization on the observed investment intensities.
The industry level technology measures are mapped into the ‘ﬁrm-input commodity’ observa-
tions as follows. The producer investment intensity is the intensity for the industry of the ﬁrm’s
major line of business, its core product i. The supplier intensity is determined by mapping the
commodity inputs at the SCG classiﬁcation into the industry classiﬁcation using appropriate con-
cordance tables (we denote the supplier’s industry by j as well).25
Table 1 shows the correlation between the diﬀerent measures of technological intensity. These
variables are clearly picking up diﬀerent things. The highest correlation is 0.56, between the number
of technologies in use and the likelihood of innovative activities. The capital intensity measure has
particularly low correlations with the frequency of R&D, only 0.06, or innovation, 0.20. The skill
intensity measure that proxies for human capital, on the other hand, has relatively high (but by no
means perfect) correlations with each of the four other measures: each of its correlations is between
0.30 and 0.44. The large degree of variation suggests that these diﬀerent measures could have a
rather diﬀerent relationship to the degree of speciﬁcity in the producer-supplier relationship.26
⇒ [Table 1 approximately here] ⇐
Investment characteristics: speciﬁcity, complementarity, appropriability
The theory assumes that the value created in the producer-supplier relationship is increased when
speciﬁc investments are made. We observe a number of variables that plausibly proxy for the level
aggregation of the working hours to construct the capital-labor ratio.
25All data are conﬁdential Statistics Canada information and have to be used on-site in Ottawa. We draw on
internal Statistics Canada concordance tables to map commodities into industries and to aggregate industries.
26These industry measures come from surveys other then the ASM and for some industries the data are missing.
18of speciﬁcity and hence indicate when the theory should apply. These measures can be thought of
as determinants of θ in the model. In the limit, for θ → 1 investments are entirely unspeciﬁc and
outsourcing will always be optimal.
We observe at the commodity level whether the input is a diﬀerentiated product, according
to the index by Rauch (1999), which is likely to increase the probability that a successful supply
relationship entails speciﬁc investments. The indicator (Rauchj) takes on a value of zero if a product
is traded on a listed exchange or if prices are quoted in trade publications, and one otherwise.
A second variable that will increase the speciﬁcity of investments is the fraction of Canadian
production the input demand of the producer constitutes (fractionfj). If this is large, outsourcing
can be a risky strategy as alternative sources of supply (or demand) can be hard to ﬁnd in the
short run. The loss in surplus when a relationship breaks down and a ﬁrm has to turn to its outside
option is likely to be related to the relative number of producers and suppliers in the industry. The
number of ﬁrms proxies for the outside options of the contracting parties and we can calculate them
at the industry (ProducersIND
i and SuppliersIND




An important technological dimension of the producer-supplier relationship can be captured
by an index of production complementarity. We deﬁne a variable Complementij to capture the
overlap in the set of input commodities needed to produce the core output i of ﬁrm f and the input
j. If the overlap is large, it is more likely that investments made by the producer of j (the supplier)
will have spillover eﬀects on the investments of the producer of i and vice versa. This is expected
to capture the eﬀect of the αPS parameter in the model.
The variable is constructed as follows. The most detailed Input-Output table gives for each
of 243 industries the input requirements in terms of 476 input commodities. For each input com-
modity j and core output i, we know the producing industry and hence the set of required input
commodities. Let Ni be the set of all inputs needed to produce output i, and Nj,i be the set
of inputs that are used both in the production of input j and the core output. The production
complementarity, Complementij, is deﬁned as Nj,i/Ni. It ranges from zero, if none of the inputs
used in the production of input j are usable in the production of output i, to unity, if all of output
i’s inputs are also used in the production of input j.
Finally, we do not have a separate variable to proxy for the ease with which investments can
be appropriated in the case of a breakdown of the relationship. However, the ﬁve technological
intensity measures surely diﬀer in this respect. At one extreme, it should be relatively easy to
appropriate, i.e. the reduction in surplus should be modest, if the owner takes control of the
physical capital investments of the subsidiary. At the other extreme, the human capital in the skill
intensity measure is likely to be accompanied with investments in tacit knowledge that are nearly
impossible to appropriate. The three innovation intensities are expected to be intermediate, with
investments associated with technology use easier to appropriate than investments associated with
R&D or other innovative activities.
19Summary statistics
A number of other variables are included in the regressions to control for idiosyncratic ﬁrm dif-
ferences. These include characteristics of the producer’s production process: the share of non-
production workers in the workforce, the total number of inputs used to produce the ﬁrm’s core
output i (a measure of complexity of the product), and labor productivity (value added per worker).
Other producer controls include the age of the ﬁrm (time since start-up for the oldest plant) and
size (log employment over all plants).27 We also include the average of the last two variables for
the producer and supplier industries, averaging across all plants in the industry.
Summary statistics for all variables are in Table A.1 in the Appendix. There are 6,199 ﬁrms
in 1988 and 7,111 ﬁrms in 1996; we treat the data as a cross-section. On average these ﬁrms use
4.69 commodity inputs. Limiting the sample to observations with nonmissing data for all controls
gives us 50,179 ﬁrm-input observations. The simple average of OUTSfj is 0.919; indicating that
the proportion of inputs that are outsourced is quite high. The weighted average of OUTSfj, using
input value weights, is lower as ﬁrms are more likely to internalize inputs that constitute larger
shares of costs. The mean value of Complementij is 0.554 which means that on average 55 percent
of inputs used in production of the core output are potentially used in the production of the input.
The average Rauchj index is 0.418—42 percent of inputs are classiﬁed as diﬀerentiated inputs. A
pattern worth noting is that the average technology intensities are very similar for producer and
supplier industries.
6 Results
Impact of speciﬁcity and complementarities on outsourcing
Before turning to the predictions of the PRT model, we ﬁrst present estimation results for equation
(10) to gauge the direct impact of speciﬁcity and complementarity on the outsourcing decision. The
results in Table 2 also illustrate the importance and direction of the eﬀect of the control variables,
which will be included in all subsequent regression.
⇒ [Table 2 approximately here] ⇐
A ﬁrst set of controls, age and size, capture market size eﬀects, as discussed in Stigler (1951).
They are signiﬁcant predictors of outsourcing, but the direction of the eﬀect is not always straight-
forward even though the results tend to be robust across the diﬀerent columns of Table 2. Stigler’s
hypothesis is that the degree of specialization, hence the opportunity for outsourcing, is limited
by the size of the market. When industries mature and grow in size, ﬁrms are expected to be
more prone to outsource. The estimates indicate that industries with older ﬁrms tend to outsource
less, but that within those industries ﬁrms that are older than the industry average outsource
27We use these controls in deviations from industry medians in order to remove industry-speciﬁc eﬀects that could
be correlated with the industry level explanatory variables of interest.
20more. Somewhat counterintuitively, the average age in the supplier industry is also associated
with reduced outsourcing, but the eﬀect is often insigniﬁcant. The average ﬁrm size in producer
industries has no pronounced eﬀect on outsourcing, but the largest ﬁrms do more in-house. Firm
size in the supplier industry, on the other hand, is positively and strongly associated with increased
outsourcing. Obviously, these are merely correlations and reverse causality clearly plays a role.
The next set of indicators captures technological explanations for outsourcing. The ﬁrm’s
productivity has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect. On the one hand, highly productivity plants have an
incentive to take on more production tasks to leverage this advantage more widely or protect their
know-how by outsourcing less. On the other hand, ﬁrms that outsource many tasks might improve
their productivity as they specialize. The same two-handed reasoning also applies to the share of
non-production (skilled) workers, which has a negative, but insigniﬁcant eﬀect on outsourcing. As
these workers are expected to be involved in production of knowledge-based assets, protection of
know-how will be more important. Their skills might also be related to the speciﬁcity of investments
in human capital, which is discussed in greater detail below.28 The number of inputs that enter a
ﬁrm’s core output (‘complexity’) is, as expected, a negative and signiﬁcant predictor of outsourcing.
It mirrors a ﬁnding in Van Biesebroeck (2006) where automobile assembly plants that produce a
larger variety of ﬁnal outputs, requiring more inputs, bring more of the assembly tasks in-house.
Our measure of technological complementarity between input j and core output i—the fraction
of inputs in i which are also used to produce j—is strongly negatively related to the likelihood
of outsourcing. Inputs that share intermediates with the core output are much more likely to be
produced in-house. In addition, the likelihood of outsourcing an input is decreasing in its cost-share,
consistent with the model in AAGZ. Both of these eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant and very large in
economic terms: a one standard deviation increase in complementarity lowers the probability of
outsourcing by 36% and a similar increase in the cost share lowers it by 23%.
We now turn to the variables that proxy for the speciﬁcity of the transaction. Columns (2)–
(7) of Table 2 report the estimates for various indicators, each indicating that greater speciﬁcity
is associated with a reduced probability of outsourcing. The negative coeﬃcient on the Rauch
indicator, in column (2), conﬁrms our prior that outsourcing is less likely for diﬀerentiated inputs,
for example because of customization. Intuitively, this objective measure of diﬀerentiation should
be a necessary condition for speciﬁcity to be relevant. The probability of outsourcing is also reduced
if the input demand of ﬁrm f represents a higher fraction of total Canadian production of good j,
in column (3). A high value is likely to make it more diﬃcult to ﬁnd alternative sources of supply
or new clients and outsourcing will be associated with poor outside options for both ﬁrms involved
in the transaction.
Next, we look at the number of producers or suppliers to proxy for the thickness of the market—
again related to the outside option of each side to the transaction. Results in column (4) are for
numbers of users and producers of commodity j, the producers and suppliers in the model. Results
28At the industry level, productivity is negatively and the fraction of non-production workers positively related to
outsourcing.
21in column (5) are comparable, but rely on ﬁrm-counts at the industry level as a robustness check.29
These measures only have an unambiguous relation to outsourcing if only one type of integration
(backward or forward) is possible or dominant in the data. The estimates, positive for number of
producers and negative for suppliers, are consistent with the relevant margin being V IB − O and
highlight the importance of the number of suppliers in particular, consistent with results in AAGZ.
If there are more producers, the outside option of the supplier is strengthened, making outsourcing a
more attractive option. With more suppliers, the expected eﬀects and estimated signs are reversed.
The eﬀects are particularly large if the number of ﬁrms is measured at the commodity level. We
can combine the opposite eﬀects of the suppliers and producers by including the (log) ratio, results
in columns (6) and (7). This produces a highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimate, with the sign again
consistent with the V IB − O trade-oﬀ.
As the signs on the numbers of ﬁrms should go in the opposite direction if the relevant trade-oﬀ
was V IF − O, the results are only consistent with the PRT predictions if backward integration
is more likely. It is possible to obtain results consistent with both types of integration if we
introduce a third term: the interaction of the numbers of suppliers and producers. If the number
of suppliers is small, the eﬀect of the number of producers on the likelihood of outsourcing will
be dominated by the uninteracted producer variable, while the sign on the interaction term will
dominate if the number of suppliers is large. At the same time, if the number of suppliers is
small, the relevant trade-oﬀ is more likely to be V IB−O as producer underinvestment under V IF
will not be remedied by outsourcing. Putting these two tendencies together, PRT considerations
predict a positive coeﬃcient on the uninteracted number of producers and a negative coeﬃcient on
the supplier-producer interaction, which is exactly what we ﬁnd in columns (8), at the commodity
level, and (9), at the industry level. If there are a large number of suppliers it is more likely that
V IF − O is the relevant margin and the dominance of the negative interaction coeﬃcient in this
case again conﬁrms with the PRT prediction.30 Similar reasoning should lead to a positive sign on
the number of suppliers as well, which is what we ﬁnd at the industry level (column (9)), but not
at the commodity level (column (8)).
Evidence on the PRT allowing for complementarities
The top panel of Table 3 contains the probit coeﬃcient estimates on the two variables of interest in
equation (11), the importance of producer (βP) and supplier (βS) investment intensities, excluding
at ﬁrst the squared diﬀerence term. The dependent variable throughout is the outsourcing dummy.
Each of the ﬁve columns uses a diﬀerent measures of technological intensity. With the exception
of the last column, the results are in line with the ﬁndings in AAGZ—which uses R&D intensity,
corresponding to the results in column (3). The same controls as in Table 1 are included, except
29While these measures are related to speciﬁcity through the impact on outside options, they will also capture
market power eﬀects, which can lead to spurious correlation with vertical integration.
30This approach is reminiscent of the reasoning behind including the interaction or squared diﬀerence term in equa-
tion (11). Including (log(# of producers) − log(# of suppliers))
2 in the regression, we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient for both the commodity and industry level measures, again consistent with the PRT predictions.
22for the industry level age and size, but not reported.31 As before, the cost-share and technological
complementarity are strongly and negatively related to the probability of outsourcing.
⇒ [Table 3 approximately here] ⇐
Most importantly, the investment intensities of producers and suppliers have opposite eﬀects
on the probability of outsourcing: negative for producers and positive for suppliers. This pattern
is consistent with the trade-oﬀ between backward vertical integration and outsourcing, as noted in
AAGZ. If producer investments are more important, ﬁrms have an incentive to give control to the
producer and bring the production of intermediates in-house. This strengthens producer incentives
and reduces their underinvestment. Greater importance of supplier investments makes backward
vertical integration, which gives low incentives to suppliers, less desirable.32
The pattern is the same for each of the four technology measures in columns (1)–(4) and
all estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1%. The coeﬃcients are estimated notable larger for supplier
investment intensities. Only when technological intensity is measured by the capital-labor ratio
become the results insigniﬁcant for producer investments and negative for supplier investment.33 Of
the ﬁve measures, physical capital is arguably the least likely to be associated with asset speciﬁcity
and the risk of hold-up. Much of the capital stock is likely to be easily redeployable in other uses,
e.g. buildings and IT equipment, or equipment can be suﬃciently ﬂexible to be useful in many
relationships. It is intuitive that the results are strongest for skills, innovation, and R&D as these
activities are more likely to be speciﬁc and require tacit non-transferable knowledge.
The results provide support for the PRT model if the relevant empirical margin is between
backward vertical integration and outsourcing and complementarities are low. As discussed ear-
lier, if both modes of integration are relevant, the signs of the coeﬃcients are ambiguous, as the
marginal eﬀect of either ﬁrm’s technological intensity on outsourcing depends on the partner ﬁrm’s
technological intensity. We can allow for forward vertical integration and still have unambiguous
predictions by including the squared diﬀerence in investment intensities in equation (11). The
diﬀerence is predicted to be negatively related to the probability of outsourcing.
Results for the augmented equation, in the middle panel of Table 3, consistently reveals the
opposite eﬀect. The coeﬃcient on the squared diﬀerence term is estimated positively in each
column. Moreover, all coeﬃcients are estimated precisely, with t-statistics ranging from 2.51 to
3.86. Trading relationships between ﬁrms in industries of vastly diﬀerent technological intensity
are found to be more likely to be organized as outsourcing relationships than occurring within
integrated ﬁrms. The PRT suggests that it would be optimal in such a situation to integrate the
ﬁrm and give the owner optimal investment incentives.
31The signs of the control variables are extremely robust across speciﬁcations and full results are available upon
request.
32As in AAGZ, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of both technology variables are strengthened if the input has a higher
cost-share.
33The results in column (5) for the capital-labor ratio were also the most sensitive to the inclusion or omission of
some of the ﬁrm or industry controls.
23Including the interaction between the investments of the producer and supplier in equation (11)
instead of the diﬀerence leads to the same ﬁnding. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term is always
estimated negative, opposite of the PRT prediction without complementarities (Proposition 1). It
suggests a negative eﬀect of each ﬁrm’s investment on outsourcing when the other ﬁrm’s investment
is large. In contrast, the PRT predicts outsourcing to be more desirable if both ﬁrms make large
investments. Complementarities are often modeled as a positive coeﬃcient on the investment
interactions in the objective function, as we did in the joint surplus function (1). Proposition 3
predicts complementarities to lead to integration, consistent with the negative estimates on the
interaction term. The coeﬃcient estimates suggest that the beneﬁcial eﬀect of complementarities
on the investment incentives of the subsidiary can dominate the negative incentive eﬀect that the
PRT focuses on.
If producing the input and the ﬁnal good requires many of the same processes and inputs,
technological complementarities can dominated the optimal organization of the transaction. This
changes the tradeoﬀ between outsourcing and integration. Even if the user and supplier industry
have to make similarly-sized investments, and the squared-diﬀerence term is low, integration can
be attractive because of spillovers between the production process of the ﬁnal good and the input.
Such similarly-sized investments are especially likely when complementarities are high and the
production processes are similar.
Estimation results for equation (12), in the bottom panel of Table 3, conﬁrm the prediction.
It turns out that the positive sign on the diﬀerence term in the middle panel is driven by high
complementary transactions. In contrast, a large diﬀerence in investment intensity is predicted to
lower the probability of outsourcing if complementarities are suﬃciently low. How low they have to
be diﬀers by technology measure. For the capital, skill, and R&D measures the eﬀect turns negative
if technological complementarities are between 1.27 and 1.43 standard deviations below the average.
For technology use and innovation intensity, complementarities of 0.85 standard deviation below
the mean are suﬃciently low to predict a negative coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence term, as predicted
by the PRT (Proposition 1).
An alternative explanation for the opposite ﬁndings in the middle panel of Table 3 is that
the investment intensities are only imperfect proxies and many transactions in the sample do
not require speciﬁc investments. Comparative advantage considerations suggest that high-tech
industries are more likely to outsource low-tech intermediates and vice versa—consistent with the
positive coeﬃcients on the investment diﬀerence term. The PRT model is only expected to be
relevant for investments that are truly relationship-speciﬁc. We explore the importance of speciﬁcity
further below.
Two robustness checks conﬁrm the main ﬁnding of Table 3. Table A.2(a) in the Appendix
reports estimates of equation (12) only for multiplant ﬁrms, where the outsourcing variable can
be measured more accurately. Results limited to the 1996 observations, where reverse causation
between the 1993 technology intensity measures and the outsourcing dummy is diminished, are in
Table A.2(b). In both cases, the results are very similar, although fewer coeﬃcients are statistically
24signiﬁcant in the smaller samples. Asymmetric investment intensities between producers and sup-
pliers are associated with integration if complementarities are low, as predicted by the PRT. The
relation reverses for high levels of complementarity, making integration more likely if investment
intensities are similar.
Further evidence: complementarities, speciﬁcity, and appropriability
To account more generally for the relative investment intensities, complementarities, the strength
of the relationship, and speciﬁcity of the transaction or investments, we also estimate the ﬂexible
speciﬁcation in equation (13). Five linear, quadratic, and interaction terms of the technological
intensities are included, with the coeﬃcients on each term varying with ﬁve observable proxies. The
full set of coeﬃcient estimates is reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix. To illustrate the results
more clearly, we evaluate the marginal eﬀects of producer and supplier investment intensity on the
likelihood of outsourcing at diﬀerent points in the data. First, in Figure 1, we evaluate the eﬀects
at low complementarities (one standard deviation below the mean) and average values for all other
variables.
⇒ [Figure 1 approximately here] ⇐
The marginal eﬀects of investments are plotted on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis
represents the (log) diﬀerence in producer minus supplier intensity, both relative to their sample
means, which played a crucial role in Proposition 1. A value of one indicates that the producer
intensity is one standard deviation higher relative to the average producer intensity than the supplier
intensity is relative to its average intensity. This can mean, for example, that the producer has
an investment intensity one standard deviation above the mean, while the supplier has average
intensity. The same x-value can represent a transaction with a producer with average investments
and suppliers with investments one standard deviation below the average, etc. We use frequency
weights from the sample to construct a weighted average for transactions with the same x-value.
Results for the full sample, on the left in Figure 1, illustrate that the PRT predictions are
strongly supported for skill intensity and also hold for innovation, but less strongly for high relative
supplier intensities—low x-values. The marginal impact of producer investments (blue, dashed
lines) is to reduce the probability of outsourcing where producer investments dominate, for high x-
values, but make outsourcing more likely for low x-values. Results for supplier investments (green,
solid lines) are opposite on both sides of the spectrum. This corresponds to the predictions of
Proposition 1. On the right, the relevant margin is between backward vertical integration and
outsourcing. A further increase in the importance of producer investment makes integration more
attractive as it gives the producer optimal incentives. At the opposite side of the x-spectrum, when
supplier investments dominate, a similar increase in producer intensity now favors outsourcing over
forward vertical integration.
For technology use and R&D, the PRT predictions are still supported for high relative producer
intensity, but at high relative supplier intensity marginal eﬀects of either ﬁrm’s investments have
25no impact on outsourcing. As AAGZ argue that forward integration is rare in manufacturing, this
could lead to limited explanatory power for the V IF −O margin. For capital intensity, the results
are still in line with the predictions for producer investment: it (weakly) decreases outsourcing
on the right and increases outsourcing on the left. The impact of supplier investments, however,
follows the same downward-sloping pattern, which is opposite of the PRT predictions. The supplier
results for capital are highly insigniﬁcant though.
The results become even more supportive if the sample is limited to multiplant ﬁrms, on
the right in Figure 1. The eﬀects at low x-values, high relative supplier intensity, are now notably
diﬀerent from zero for innovation and R&D as well and even for technology use is the marginal eﬀect
of producer investment slightly positive. As can be seen from the vertical scales, the magnitudes
of the marginal eﬀects tend to be two to four times larger for multiplant ﬁrms.
In the following three ﬁgures, we focus on the eﬀects of three crucial parameters in the
model. First, in Figure 2, we vary the level of complementarities (αPS) which are proxied by
the Complement variable that measures the overlap in inputs between the two contracting ﬁrms.
Second, in Figure 3, we vary the speciﬁcity of the transaction (θ) using two of the variables that
were shown to predict outsourcing in Table 1: Rauch and the ratio of Producersi to Suppliersj.
Third, in Figure 4, we compare the marginal eﬀects for the ﬁve technology intensities as the diﬀerent
investments have a natural ordering in terms of appropriability (λ).
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀects of varying levels of complementarities in the case of skill intensity.
Results for the other innovative measures are qualitatively similar, but the diﬀerences tend to be
less pronounced. The solid lines repeat the low complementarity patterns already shown in Figure
1. The eﬀects for producers are now shown in black and for suppliers in grey. The dashed lines
represents marginal investment eﬀects for average levels of complementarities and the dotted lines
are for high complementarities (mean plus one standard deviation).
For medium and, especially, for high levels of complementarities the marginal eﬀects of invest-
ments change signs everywhere. The eﬀect of higher producer investments on outsourcing quickly
turn positive on the right, where we expect the relevant margin to be between backward vertical
integration and outsourcing.34 As Proposition 2 demonstrates, complementarities can explain such
an eﬀect, at least if the ease of appropriation of the investments is suﬃciently high and investments
are not too speciﬁc. Greater importance of producer investment can lead to outsourcing because
it increases the cost of supplier underinvestment in the presence of complementarities. Further
complementarities strengthen this eﬀect, but unexpectedly, the results indicate that it also leads to
increased integration if supplier investment rises.35 Results for the V IF −O tradeoﬀ are the mirror
image. At least for supplier investments, with medium or high complementarities the positive eﬀect
on the outsourcing probability on the left is more pronounced than the negative eﬀect on the right,
which is intuitive.
34By construction, the marginal eﬀects eventually turn to zero at the extremes because the derivative of equation
(13) is multiplied by the normal density function to construct the marginal eﬀects.
35Proposition 2 is not informative here as it only applies to low levels of complementarities.
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Clearly, the degree of speciﬁcity will also inﬂuence the eﬀect of investments on outsourcing. In
Figure 3 we plot the marginal eﬀects again for skill intensity, evaluating the variables that proxy
for speciﬁcity at high and low values. The short-dashed lines are for transactions that involve
homogenous products according to the Rauch measure, which are likely to be less speciﬁc. The
long-dashed lines are for diﬀerentiated product transactions where there are far more suppliers than
producers and the solid lines represent similar situations but with relatively more producers. As
before, producer marginal eﬀects are in black and supplier’s in grey. The results are extremely
similar for innovation and similar but less pronounced for R&D and technology use.
⇒ [Figure 3 approximately here] ⇐
The Rauch measure that captures product diﬀerentiation reinforces the eﬀects in line with the
predictions. The short-dashed lines are almost uniformly closer to the zero line, indicating that
investments are much less informative for the outsourcing patterns of homogenous goods. The
marginal eﬀects for diﬀerentiated goods are particularly more pronounced for supplier investments.
The eﬀects of a high (relative) number of producers are less obvious, but the results are again
supportive of the PRT predictions. For low x-values where the tradeoﬀ is between V IF and O, we
expect stronger results for the long-dashed lines. If there are relatively more suppliers and fewer
producers, the outside option of the producer (which underinvests under V IF) is strengthened. On
the left in Figure 3, the two solid black line are closer to the zero-line than the long-dashed lines,
in line with the predictions. Producer investments are less likely to lead to outsourcing if there
are many of them. From the suppliers’ perspective, a similar increase in their relative numbers
strengthens the positive impact of their investments on integration (V IF) because they have weak
outside options in outsourcing in this case.
Similar eﬀects apply in reverse on the right where backward integration is more relevant, but
only at extremely high x-values. Only at the extreme right is the negative eﬀect of producer
investment on the likelihood of outsourcing boosted by the presence of many producers. Similarly,
the existence of few suppliers reinforces the positive eﬀect of supplier investment on outsourcing,
but only at the extreme right.
The ﬁnal important parameter in the model (λ) is the ease with which the owner of the
integrated ﬁrm can appropriate the subsidiary’s investment should bargaining break down. The
results in Proposition 2 indicate that high λ makes it more likely that complementarities will
overturn the benchmark PRT predictions. At the extreme, if λ is one integration becomes highly
unattractive as subsidiaries stop investing altogether. The diﬀerent investment measures are likely
to diﬀer in appropriability. A priori, we would expect the order of increasing ease of appropriation
to be as follows: skill, innovation, R&D, technology use, capital. Investments that require human
capital are likely to be most diﬃcult to appropriate (be highly “complementarity” in the Hart and
Moore (1990) terminology). Innovation is likely to entail more tacit knowledge than R&D and the
27use of advanced technologies is similarly expected to incorporate more tacit knowledge than general
capital equipment.
⇒ [Figure 4 approximately here] ⇐
The magnitude of the marginal eﬀects in Figure 4 follows the same ordering. The eﬀects for
skill and innovation are drawn on a separate graph (at the bottom) because the eﬀects are an order
of magnitude larger. The shape of the marginal investment incentives for these two measures is
also most in line with the PRT predictions. For the other three measures, the eﬀects are smaller,
especially for supplier investments. Interestingly, the evidence in AAGZ which we conﬁrmed for
our data in the top panel of Table 3, suggests that integration is more likely to put the producer in
control. In the range where supplier investments dominate, at low x-values, the most pronounced
eﬀects are for producer investments which reduce the probability of integration. It suggests that
integration is particularly damaging for the subsidiary’s incentives for these measures.
7 Conclusions
Our ﬁndings are fourfold:
• Augmenting the property rights model with complementarities is able to generate a rich set
of theoretical predictions. First, it can destroy the usual PRT tendency for integration if
investment intensities are suﬃciently asymmetric. Second, low amounts of complementarities
will, all else equal, lead to more integration.
• Plausible proxies for speciﬁcity have predictive power for the ownership structure in Canadian
manufacturing. Transactions are more likely to take place in an integrated ﬁrm if the inputs
are diﬀerentiated, the production process is more complex, the producer purchases a large
fraction of total Canadian production of the input, and the outside options of the two ﬁrms
are low or very asymmetric. These correlations are in line with TCE and PRT. Without
speciﬁcity of investments—acquiring relationship-speciﬁc assets or customizing the input—
there would be no reason to vertically integrate.
• At low levels of complementarities, the PRT predictions are strongly supported: large asym-
metries in investments lead to integration. The marginal eﬀect of producer investments is
to make integration more likely when producer investments dominate and outsourcing more
likely when supplier investments are relatively more important. Eﬀects for supplier invest-
ments are exactly the opposite, in line with the theory.
• By and large, the eﬀects of complementarities, speciﬁcity, and appropriability on the marginal
impact of investments are in line with the theoretical predictions. The existence of comple-
mentarities, proxied by the overlap in the input set of producers and suppliers, destroys the
previous prediction. High speciﬁcity and low appropriability enhance the PRT predictions,
both making integration optimal for less pronounced investment asymmetries.
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30Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
We only discuss the trade-oﬀ between backward vertical integration and outsourcing. As the
problem is entirely symmetric for producers and suppliers, the trade-oﬀ between forward vertical
integration and outsourcing is entirely similar.
The optimal investments, in equations (8) and (9), can be substituted in the aggregate wel-
fare function to obtain the joint value that the two ﬁrms attain in either mode of organization.
We assume – as in Whinston (2003) or AAGZ – that the choice of organizational form prior to
the investment decisions, is accompanied by transfers, such that ﬁrms will always decide on the
organization that maximizes joint surplus.
In each organizational form, aggregate welfare is given by the joint surplus generated within

















S (z ∈ {V IB,O}) given by equations (8) and (9).
The threshold between the V IB and O organizational forms is characterized by ∆W = WV IB−
WO = 0. We look at the comparative statics in ∆W to see how this threshold changes with the
importance of the producer’s investment in the special case where αS = 0 (the most advantageous
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To evaluate this expression we substitute the optimal investment policies, which in the case of
αS = 0 simplify to:
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if λ > 0.45
or if λ = θ > 0.21,
in which case V IB will never be optimal. There is thus a threshold for λ above which outsourcing
will be preferred over integration irrespective of αP. This threshold is least binding (0.45) for θ = 0
and falls to 0.21 for the highest realistic value for θ (= λ). 
Proof of Proposition 3
The welfare function is as before in equation (14). We now consider how complementarities aﬀect
the diﬀerence between WV IB and WO:
∂∆W
∂αPS
= (αS + αPSxV IB
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Note that if λ = θ = 1 both derivatives are smaller under integration than under outsourcing.






∂αPS and if αP is suﬃciently large relative







Substituting all these expressions in the partial derivative of ∆W, it is impossible to determine
its sign in general. However, the expressions simplify considerably at low levels of complementari-






, calculating the derivative at the limit for αPS going to
zero. In this case both the optimal investments and the partial derivatives simplify considerably to
xV IB





























If λ = θ = 0, the only diﬀerence is that underinvestment is greater for the producer under O than
32under V IB, and the supplier’s investment is more responsive to an increase in complementarities
in V IB relative to O.







4αPαS [(1 − λ)(3 + λ) − 2(1 + θ)] > 0 if λ < λ(θ) (15)
Over the relevant range (λ ∈ [0,1] and θ ∈ [0,λ]), this is decreasing in λ and θ. For λ <
√
5−2 ≈ 0.24
it is always positive, even if θ = λ (the maximum value of θ). If θ = 0, the expression remains
positive as long as λ <
√
2 − 1. Clearly, the highest λ that still makes (15) positive is decreasing
in θ. At the extremes, the expression is guaranteed to be positive if λ = 0 and certainly negative
if λ = 1, irrespective of θ.
Moreover, if we do not take the limit for αPS → 0, but only α2
PS → 0 the expressions simplify
not as much, but enough to establish that the λ threshold for the expression in (15) to be positive















h(1 − λ)(3 + λ)
4
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+ f(λ,θ) with f(λ(θ),θ) > 0
In general, this relaxes the constraint on λ for the marginal eﬀect of αPS to still be positive. The
extent to which the constraint is relaxed depends on the parameters in the surplus production
function (αP,αS, and αPS), but as long as they are positive the constraint on λ becomes less
binding. Evaluated at its stringiest level, i.e. at θ = λ, the terms in the square brackets would be
positive at 0.41, the earlier threshold. At θ = 0, the ﬁrst term in square brackets only becomes











































































Technology use Technology use
Capital Capital
Producer investments Supplier investments
X-axis: Producer minus Supplier intensity
Figure 1: Marginal effect of investments on outsourcing at low complementarity







-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
X-axis: Producer - Supplier intensity
Producer: low complementarity Supplier: low complementarity
Producer: medium complement. Supplier: medium complement.
Producer: high complementarity Supplier: high complementarity
Figure 2: Marginal effect of skill intensity on outsourcing

















-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
X-axis: Producer minus Supplier intensity
Producer: low specificity Supplier: low specificity
P: differentiated & few producers S: differentiated & many suppliers
P: differentiated & many producers S: differentiated & few suppliers
Figure 3: Marginal effect of skill intensity on outsourcing
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X-axis: Producer - Supplier intensity
Producer: capital Supplier: capital
Producer: R&D Supplier: R&D







-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
X-axis: Producer - Supplier intensity
Producer: skill Supplier: skill
Producer: innovation Supplier: innovation
Figure 4: Marginal effect of investment intensities on outsourcing
(for low complementarities and high specificity)Table 1. Correlations between different technological intensities
Skill Innovation R&D Technology use Capital
Skill 1
Innovation 0.30 1
R&D 0.44 0.44 1
Technology use 0.38 0.56 0.35 1
Capital 0.32 0.20 0.06 0.35 1
Notes: partial correlation statistics between the producer's technology intensity measuresTable 2: Importance of specificity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Size -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.122*** -0.139*** -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.128*** -0.139*** -0.129***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Size
P -0.038 -0.019 -0.032 -0.034 -0.037 -0.014 -0.023 -0.031 -0.035
(0.035) (0.042) (0.034) (0.037) (0.041) (0.033) (0.040) (0.037) (0.043)
Size
S 0.237*** 0.261*** 0.238*** -0.020 0.217*** 0.086* 0.228*** -0.035 0.206***
(0.061) (0.073) (0.061) (0.047) (0.056) (0.050) (0.061) (0.047) (0.057)
Age 0.059** 0.045 0.058** 0.013*** 0.058* 0.013 0.059** 0.013 0.057**
(0.030) (0.037) (0.030) (0.036) (0.030) (0.035) (0.030) (0.036) (0.029)
Age
P -0.032** -0.045*** -0.032** -0.054*** -0.031** -0.051*** -0.031** -0.056*** -0.028**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Age
S -0.033* -0.053*** -0.034* -0.012 -0.039** -0.036** -0.037** -0.007 -0.033*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019)
Productivity 0.001 -0.012 0.004 -0.036 0.002 -0.022 0.002 -0.037 -0.008
(0.033) (0.036) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032)
Non-production workers -0.101 -0.135 -0.106 -0.232 -0.089 -0.207 -0.096 -0.231 -0.089
(0.145) (0.171) (0.145) (0.145) (0.143) (0.144) (0.143) (0.144) (0.142)
Complexity -0.124 -0.145 -0.118 -0.107 -0.109 -0.060 -0.132 -0.115 -0.087
(0.090) (0.100) (0.090) (0.095) (0.099) (0.095) (0.093) (0.094) (0.101)
Cost share -1.119*** -1.164*** -1.087*** -0.892*** -1.126*** -0.935*** -1.128*** -0.862*** -1.124***
(0.096) (0.113) (0.098) (0.095) (0.094) (0.096) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093)
Complement -1.643*** -1.742*** -1.633*** -1.742*** -1.627*** -1.654*** -1.631*** -1.749*** -1.571***
(0.174) (0.209) (0.176) (0.168) (0.177) (0.160) (0.178) (0.168) (0.182)
Rauchj -0.086
(0.095)














(log Prod - log Supp)
COM 0.368***
(0.020)
(log Prod - log Supp)
IND 0.025
(0.458)
(log Prod x log Supp)
COM -0.024*
(0.012)
(log Prod x log Supp)
IND -0.061***
(0.019)
Observations 50179 44769 50179 43352 50179 43352 50179 43352 50,179
log likelihood -12209 -9802 -12195 -10057 -12200 -10284 -12204 -10041 -12,114
Notes: Coefficient estimates from Probit estimations pooling two years (1988 and 1996), standard errors (clustered at industry level) in 
brackets.  ***Significant at the 1% level, **5%, *10%.
Dependent variable is firm-commodity outsourcing indicatorTable 3(a): Simple property rights model
II =  Skill Innovation R&D Tech. use Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Producer Investment Intensity (II
P) -1.362*** -0.456** 0.140 -0.061** -0.044*
(0.368) (0.223) (0.222) (0.026) (0.024)
Supplier Investment Intensity (II
S) 2.324*** 1.274*** 0.848*** 0.126*** 0.030*
(0.321) (0.194) (0.155) (0.028) (0.016)
Observations 53632 50404 50404 50404 53971
log likelihood -13249 -12268 -12413 -12481 -13561
Table 3(b): Property rights model with investment interactions
II =  Skill Innovation R&D Tech. use Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Producer Investment Intensity (II
P) -1.367*** -0.522** 0.106 -0.073** -0.019
(0.419) (0.241) (0.229) (0.031) (0.031)
Supplier Investment Intensity (II
S) 2.062*** 1.207*** 0.736*** 0.113*** 0.033*




2 8.901*** 0.878** 1.081*** 0.028*** 0.027***
(2.303) (0.350) (0.417) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 53632 50404 50404 50404 53971
log likelihood -13131 -12239 -12370 -12429 -13376
Table 3(c): Property rights model with investment and complementarity interactions
II =  Skill Innovation R&D Tech. use Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Producer Investment Intensity (II
P) -0.969** -0.545** 0.074 -0.077** -0.003
(0.397) (0.231) (0.219) (0.030) (0.029)
Supplier Investment Intensity (II
S) 1.569*** 1.197*** 0.745*** 0.120*** 0.021




2 -12.591*** -2.170** -0.770 -0.046* -0.018




2  x Complement 47.310*** 5.929*** 3.265* 0.126** 0.079***
(8.305) (2.005) (1.739) (0.053) (0.028)
Observations 53632 50404 50404 50404 53971
log likelihood -12976 -12184 -12350 -12379 -13320
Dependent variable is firm-commodity outsourcing indicator
Notes: Coefficient estimates from Probit estimations pooling two years (1988 and 1996), standard errors 
(clustered at industry level) in brackets. Results in each column use different measures of investment 
intensity (indicated at the top). Controls included are firm size, age, productivity, share of nonproduction 
workers, complexity, cost-share, complement, and a 1996 dummy. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** 5%, *
10%.
Dependent variable is firm-commodity outsourcing indicator
Dependent variable is firm-commodity outsourcing indicatorTable A.1 Summary statistics
N MEAN STD
OUTS 50179 0.919 0.272
Cost-share 50179 0.125 0.226
Complement 50179 0.573 0.241
Specificity proxies
log Producers
IND 50179 4.736 1.346
log Suppliers
IND 50179 4.147 1.293
log (Prod- Supp)
IND 50179 0.590 1.737
log Producers
COM 50179 3.684 1.383
log Suppliers
COM 43352 2.207 1.459
log (Prod- Supp)
COM 43352 1.658 1.466
Fractionfj 50179 0.073 0.189
Rauchj 44769 0.440 0.496
Investment intensities (industry level)
II
P
K/L 50179 3.602 1.562
II
S





K/L 50179 4.686 7.968
II
P
skill 50090 0.452 0.118
II
S





skill 49845 0.014 0.021
II
P
R&D 50072 0.361 0.225
II
S





R&D 50064 0.066 0.112
II
P
tech 50072 1.734 1.239
II
S





tech 50064 2.428 4.067
II
P
innov 50072 0.272 0.200
II
S





innov 50064 0.066 0.112
Firm level controls
Size 50179 2.072 1.687
Age 50179 0.271 0.471
Productivity 50179 0.544 0.608
Non-production workers 50179 0.018 0.157
Industry level controls
Complexity 50179 3.995 0.410
Size
P 50179 4.406 1.300
Size
S 50179 4.639 1.185
Age
P 50179 16.477 3.308
Age
S 50179 17.085 3.679Table A.2(a): Robustness check for property rights model: multi-plant firms
Dependent variable is firm-commodity outsourcing indicator
II =  Skill Innovation R&D Tech. use Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Producer Investment Intensity (II
P) -0.858*** -0.333* 0.095 -0.055** -0.004
(0.334) (0.202) (0.209) (0.026) (0.027)
Supplier Investment Intensity (II
S) 1.837*** 1.181*** 0.886*** 0.089*** 0.029




2 -15.142*** -1.773** -0.449 -0.052*** -0.023*




2  x Complement 42.137*** 4.718*** 2.459* 0.148*** 0.071***
(8.439) (1.513) (1.512) (0.037) (0.022)
Observations 24756 24808 24808 24808 24836
log likelihood -6867.2 -6928.6 -6997 -7045.5 -7037.6
Table A.2(b): Robustness check for property rights model: 1996 observations
II =  Skill Innovation R&D Tech. use Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Producer Investment Intensity (II
P) -1.047** -0.526* 0.117 -0.044 0.017
(0.478) (0.300) (0.250) (0.034) (0.031)
Supplier Investment Intensity (II
S) 1.824*** 1.254*** 0.783*** 0.129*** 0.029




2 -18.248*** -1.761 -0.228 -0.031 -0.015




2  x Complement 52.824*** 5.881** 2.762 0.097 0.082***
(10.731) (2.874) (2.100) (0.066) (0.030)
Observations 23339 23449 23449 23449 23506
log likelihood -5571.7 -5566.7 -5655.8 -5687.5 -5673.9
Notes: Coefficient estimates from Probit estimations pooling two years (1988 and 1996), standard errors 
(clustered at industry level) in brackets. Results in each column use different measures of investment 
intensity (indicated at the top). Controls included are firm size, age, productivity, share of nonproduction 
workers, complexity, cost-share, complement, and a 1996 dummy. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** 5%, 
* 10%.
Dependent variable is firm-commodity outsourcing indicatorTable A.3: Full set of results for flexible property rights model (coefficient estimates)
II =  Skill Innovation R&D Tech. use Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size -0.047*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.051***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
Age 0.102*** 0.127*** 0.130*** 0.115*** 0.113***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Non-production workers -0.115 -0.106 -0.063 -0.029 -0.100
(0.143) (0.140) (0.139) (0.144) (0.147)
Productivity -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028)
Cost share -1.314 -1.336*** -0.855** -0.856*** -1.695***
(1.309) (0.322) (0.362) (0.269) (0.520)
Complexity 0.162 -0.056 -0.118 -0.046 0.008
(0.116) (0.119) (0.115) (0.111) (0.122)
Complement -5.032*** -2.796*** -3.172*** -2.70*** -2.492***
(1.536) (0.592) (0.749) (0.735) (0.585)
II
P -0.603 -2.417 -3.969** -0.367 0.197
(5.455) (1.561) (1.741) (0.271) (0.195)
II
S -7.060 -1.833 -1.883 -0.445 -0.966***
(5.460) (1.815) (1.464) (0.307) (0.239)
II
P x II
S 13.787 1.815 2.191 0.180*** -0.023
(10.418) (2.055) (1.614) (0.066) (0.034)
(II
P)
2 -6.063 1.896 2.626 -0.039 -0.006
(6.751) (1.821) (1.798) (0.045) (0.028)
(II
S)
2 -0.095 1.467 1.564 0.018 0.123***
(7.352) (2.273) (1.626) (0.061) (0.032)
(II
P) x Complement 1.948 2.781 3.159 0.365 -0.447
(8.292) (2.798) (2.651) (0.406) (0.317)
(II
S) x Complement 10.905 4.001 4.179* 0.623 0.891***
(8.401) (2.819) (2.275) (0.448) (0.352)
(II
P x II
S) x Complement -88.228*** -13.075*** -6.987** -0.398*** -0.127***
(19.846) (3.572) (3.293) (0.096) (0.043)
(II
P)
2 x Complement 41.974*** 3.467 1.194 0.172** 0.102**
(13.400) (3.032) (2.741) (0.077) (0.049)
(II
S)
2 x Complement 35.104*** 1.574 -1.518 0.027 -0.024
(13.137) (3.495) (2.720) (0.100) (0.046)
(II
P) x Cost share -5.160 0.574 1.230 -0.379* 0.465**
(5.073) (1.569) (2.435) (0.214) (0.231)
(II
S) x  Cost share 6.717 1.760 -2.006 -0.097 -0.103
(6.290) (2.271) (1.872) (0.239) (0.175)
(II
P x II
S) x Cost share -42.894*** -5.454** -9.279*** -0.046 -0.058**
(11.565) (2.541) (3.414) (0.053) (0.026)
(II
P)
2 x Cost share 23.607*** 1.592 2.966 0.099** -0.042
(6.957) (2.367) (3.361) (0.051) (0.028)
(II
S)
2 x Cost share 17.257* 0.663 6.694*** 0.077* 0.057**
(9.790) (2.104) (2.395) (0.046) (0.023)
Rauch dummy 1.053 0.133 -0.122 -0.110 -0.256
(0.839) (0.266) (0.322) (0.268) (0.388)
(II
P) x Rauch -8.836*** -0.480 1.849** 0.127 0.118
(2.818) (0.959) (0.776) (0.151) (0.107)
(II
S) x  Rauch 5.644 1.129 -0.836 0.181 0.148
(3.636) (1.472) (1.284) (0.201) (0.162)
(II
P x II
S) x Rauch 4.984 1.131 -0.811 0.018 0.006
(7.038) (1.618) (1.223) (0.036) (0.019)
(II
P)
2 x Rauch 6.338 -0.042 -1.236 -0.037 -0.011
(4.765) (1.094) (0.886) (0.028) (0.014)
(II
S)
2 x Rauch -8.475 -2.146 1.505 -0.037 -0.021
(5.679) (1.896) (1.419) (0.047) (0.022)
Multi-plant dummy -0.934** -0.484*** -0.710*** -0.282* -0.423*
(0.487) (0.154) (0.223) (0.156) (0.255)
(II
P) x Multi-plant 2.078 1.260 2.263** 0.190 -0.007
(2.613) (0.843) (0.941) (0.124) (0.120)
(II
S) x  Multi-plant 0.278 -0.819 -0.622 -0.328** 0.031
(2.872) (0.816) (0.779) (0.130) (0.101)
(II
P x II
S) x Multi-plant 17.495*** 4.296** 1.851 0.009 0.098***
(6.866) (1.783) (1.264) (0.043) (0.024)
(II
P)
2 x Multi-plant -10.737*** -3.527* -3.504*** -0.044 -0.050***
(4.083) (1.860) (1.253) (0.034) (0.019)
(II
S)
2 x Multi-plant -8.884* -0.507 0.096 0.067** -0.045**
(5.365) (0.972) (0.929) (0.031) (0.019)
log (# prod. / # suppl.) 0.181** 0.070*** 0.072* 0.066** 0.035
(rel. #) (0.104) (0.028) (0.039) (0.032) (0.031)
(II
P) x (rel. #) -0.276 -0.121 -0.113 -0.028 0.018
(0.354) (0.108) (0.152) (0.022) (0.013)
(II
S) x  (rel. #) 0.026 0.412*** 0.344** 0.069*** 0.026**
(0.457) (0.141) (0.141) (0.024) (0.012)
(II
P x II
S) x (rel. #) 0.137 -0.023 -0.246 -0.003 0.000
(0.535) (0.169) (0.195) (0.004) (0.002)
(II
P)
2 x (rel. #) 0.043 0.044 0.224 0.005 -0.002
(0.424) (0.130) (0.150) (0.004) (0.001)
(II
S)
2 x (rel. #) -0.050 -0.456*** -0.313* -0.010* -0.003**
(0.556) (0.152) (0.178) (0.006) (0.002)
Constant 3.351** 3.191*** 3.958*** 3.402*** 3.508***
(1.790) (0.600) (0.595) (0.710) (0.530)
Observations 40659 38451 38451 38451 40939
log likelihood -9285.2 -8596.2 -8639.0 -8626.7 -9374.5
Dependent variable is firm-commodity outsourcing indicator
Notes: Coefficient estimates from Probit estimations pooling two years (1988 and 1996), standard errors (clustered 
at industry level) in brackets.  Results in each column use different measures of investment intensity (indicated at 
the top). ***Significant at the 1% level, **5%, *10%.